Expert Panel Reports False Accounts by US Political and Military Leaders on 9/11

Massive National War Games on September 11th Raise Further Questions

By The 9/11 Consensus Panel

NEW YORK, June 5, 2012 —  New evidence shows that the September 11th activities of former President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were falsely reported by official sources.

The 20-member 9/11 Consensus Panel analyzed evidence from press reports, FOIA requests, and archived 9/11 Commission file documents to produce eight new studies, released today.

The international Panel also discovered that four massive aerial practice exercises traditionally held in October were in full operation on 9/11. The largest, Global Guardian, held annually by NORAD and the US Strategic and Space Commands, had originally been scheduled for October 22-31 but was moved, along with Vigilant Guardian, to early September.

Although senior officials claimed  no one could have predicted using hijacked planes as weapons, the military had been practicing similar exercises on 9/11 itself — and for years before it.

The Panel, discovering widespread reports of confusion and delays in the defense response, looked into who was overseeing the air defenses after the second Tower was hit at 9:03 AM.

Official sources claimed neither Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Joint Chiefs of Staff Acting Chairman General Richard Myers (filling in for General Hugh Shelton), nor war-room chief General Montague Winfield were available to take command until well after the Pentagon was struck about 9:37.

Yet emerging documents and memoirs show that top leaders were engaged earlier — and later discussed a shootdown of the “let’s roll” Flight 93 before debris was scattered widely around its alleged Shanksville, Pennsylvania crash site.

Most intriguing is the mystery of who was running the Pentagon’s war-room during the critical early hours.

These findings follow hard on the Kuala Lumpur Tribunal’s May 15th verdict that Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld were guilty of torture and war crimes.

New Studies:

Did Military Exercises Show that the Military was Prepared for Domestic (as Well as Foreign) Hijackings?

Discussion here, with following conclusion:

Contrary to claims by The 9/11 Commission Report, US military exercises prior to 9/11 involved hijackings – within as well as outside US airspace – in which planes were used as weapons. Any new investigation should ask why the highest responsible officials denied that such preparation had preceded the attacks on 9/11, and why, given that preparation, no effective actions were taken to stop the hijacked planes from reaching their targets.

The Claim that the Military Exercises Did Not Delay the Response to the 9/11 Attacks

Discussion here, with following conclusion:

Because of the rescheduling of military exercises normally scheduled for different times, there were an extraordinary number of exercises underway the morning of September 11, 2001.

The Department of Defense and the 9/11 Commission failed to report all but one of the exercises that occurred that morning. They also denied that such exercises slowed down military responses to the attacks.

Had the 9/11 Commission reported the full extent of the exceptional number of exercises it knew were operating that morning, the above-quoted statements by military officers such as Eberhart, Marr, and Myers – that the exercises did not, by causing confusion, slow down the military response – would have seemed implausible.

Any new investigation should probe the fact that, taken together, this evidence suggests that:

(1) the Pentagon, after creating conditions that confused the military response to the attacks, sought to cover up its creation of these conditions, and that

(2) the 9/11 Commission facilitated this cover-up by not making public the information held in its records cited above.

Overview of Contradicted Claims about Key Military and Political Leaders

Discussion here, with following conclusion:

These six accounts are of different types: two of them are about men – Bush and Shelton – who were out of town, whereas the other four are about men who were in Washington. But all six accounts have two things in common:

  • All six men were officials who had positions from which they could have affected the outcome of the 9/11 attacks.
  • The 9/11 Commission gave an account of each man that is contradicted by considerable evidence.

These six accounts provide, therefore, a remarkable fact: that the 9/11 Commission has evidently given false accounts of the behavior of six officials occupying positions from which they could have affected the outcomes of the 9/11 attacks.

This interlocking evidence clearly points to the need for further investigation into the roles of key government and military officials on September 11, 2001.

When Did Cheney Authorize the Shoot-down of Civilian Planes?

Discussion here, with following conclusion:

The 9/11 Commission claimed that Cheney did not issue a shoot-down authorization until 10:10 or later, whereas the evidence shows that Cheney gave the authorization by 9:50 – hence at least 20 minutes earlier than the Commission claimed. This 20-minute difference means the difference between whether military pilots could, or could not, have been ordered to shoot down United Flight 93 (which reportedly crashed at 10:03).

The Commission’s claim about the time of the shoot-down authorization was not the only part of the official account of the shoot-down authorization that was problematic: The press focused on the Bush administration’s claim that Cheney had transmitted authorization received from the President (rather than declaring it on his own, which would have been illegal), about which even the 9/11 Commission was skeptical.22

More important to the truth about 9/11, however, was the 9/11 Commission’s claim that the shoot-down authorization was not given by Cheney until 10:10 or later, hence after United 93 had crashed. This claim is contradicted by reports from Richard Clarke, U.S. News and World Report, Pentagon correspondent Barbara Starr, the FAA, and three military officers: Col. Marr, Gen. Arnold, and Brig. Gen. Winfield.

Moreover, the 9/11 Commission’s 10:10-or-later claim presupposed the Commission’s claim that Cheney did not enter the PEOC, where he took charge, until almost 10:00, and this claim is contradicted by abundant evidence, as shown in Point MC-3.23

Any new investigation needs to ask why the 9/11 Commission made a claim about the time of Cheney’s shoot-down authorization that contradicted a great deal of evidence.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s Behavior between 9:00 and 10:00

Discussion here, with following conclusion:

The 9/11 Commission absolved Donald Rumsfeld of any responsibility for what happened after 9:03 that morning by claiming that, in the first hour of the White House video teleconference, “none of the [Defense] personnel involved in managing the crisis [participated].”21 Reports by both Richard Clarke and Robert Andrews, however, show that Rumsfeld participated in this videoconference during this crucial hour.

The 9/11 Commission also absolved Rumsfeld from any involvement in the crash of UA 93 by claiming that the military did not know anything about UA 93 until after it had crashed, and that Rumsfeld was not in the NMCC prior to 10:30. Paul Wolfowitz, however, indicated that he discussed what to do about UA 93 with Rumsfeld and Myers before 10:00.

Testimonies by Richard Clarke, Robert Andrews, and Paul Wolfowitz, accordingly, provided very strong evidence that the 9/11 Commission made false claims relevant to Rumsfeld’s behavior. Further investigation of Rumsfeld’s actual behavior on the morning of 9/11, therefore, is needed.

The Activities of General Richard Myers during the 9/11 Attacks

Discussion here, with following conclusion:

In light of the above problems –

  • the contradictions between the 2004 accounts by Myers and the 9/11 Commission, on the one hand, and the accounts by Richard Clarke, Paul Wolfowitz, Captain Leidig, General Shelton, Thomas White, and, even the Myers [statement] of 2001, on the other;
  • the inconsistencies between the earlier and later stories told by Myers;
  • and the implausibilities in the accounts by Myers and Cleland –

the evidence suggests that the official account about Myers – according to which he was not in the Pentagon during the attacks and also could not have been involved in a decision to bring down United 93 – is false, and should be further investigated.

The Time of General Shelton’s Return to his Command

Discussion here, with following conclusion:

The account provided by both Shelton and Giesemann, according to which they were able to return to the Pentagon without delay – evidently reaching it by roughly 12:30 PM – is contradicted by their plane’s flight navigator, by the flight tracking strip, by General Richard Myers, and by one of Giesemann’s own statements. If, as it appears, Shelton and Giesemann falsely claimed that they returned almost five hours earlier than they actually did, it must be asked: Why?

And if, as appears to be the case, Shelton returned to Andrews at 4:40 PM, why was the aircraft of the top US military commander delayed for almost five hours on this critical day?

Any new investigation should ask these two questions.

The Activities of Brigadier General Montague Winfield between 8:30 and 10:30 AM

Discussion here, with following conclusion:

The Pentagon has not provided a credible account of the behavior of Winfield during the attacks. Although initially there was reason to assume – as did the ABC and CNN programs in 2002 – that the DDO’s role was performed by Winfield, the Pentagon later stated that this assumption was not true, by saying that the role of the DDO was taken over by Leidig. The serious problems with this second account, however, suggest that the Pentagon and the 9/11 Commission have not reported the truth about the work of the DDO, and about Winfield’s behavior, during the attacks.

If so, was this to minimize Winfield’s role because, after the Pentagon and the 9/11 Commission declared in 2004 that the military did not know about UA Flight 93′s hijacking until after it had crashed, Winfield had become a liability — due to his 2002 ABC statement that the military had decided “to try to go intercept flight 93″?

An investigation is needed to answer this question.

The Consensus Panel has completed 25 educational studies (using a medical consensus model) offering the “best evidence” regarding specific official claims about 9/11. Its goal is to “provide a ready source of evidence-based research to any investigation that may be undertaken by the public, the media, academia, or any other investigative body or institution.” The website is being translated into French, Spanish, and other languages.

5 responses to “Expert Panel Reports False Accounts by US Political and Military Leaders on 9/11

  1. Reblogged this on The GOLDEN RULE and commented:
    Lies and damned lies,
    These three have much for which to be held responsible. None of it good.
    Basically, individual human weapons of mass destruction.

  2. “The men that American people admire most extravagantly are the most daring liars; the men they detest the most violently are those who try to tell them the truth”. H.L. Mencken

  3. Kudos. Even though these questions scarcely begin to show how deep the rabbit hole goes, they show the right way to start: a merciless examination of properly catalogued evidence.

  4. Elizabeth,

    Why do you think the level of option activity in United was so unusual when similar or higher levels of option activity occurred a number of times during 2001?

  5. Well written, the supreme court has given those in power the right to hide. This includes those in power whose mental disorders, temporary or otherwise, raise havoc.

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